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A Socialist Republican Theory of Freedom and Government 
 
Abstract: 
 
In response to the republican revival of the ideal of freedom as non-domination, a 
number of ‘radical,’ ‘labour’ and ‘workplace’ republicans have criticised the 
limitations of Philip Pettit’s account of freedom and government. This article 
proposes that the missing link in these debates is the relationship between 
republicanism and socialism. Seeking to bring this connection back into view in 
historical and theoretical terms, the article draws from contemporary radical 
republicans and the writings of Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg to propose a 
socialist republican theory of freedom and government. This consists of a conception 
of freedom as collective autonomy and a participatory democratic vision of a 
decentralised state with parliamentary institutions, the rule of law, worker-controlled 
workplaces, community-directed investment and a political culture of solidarity and 
public-spiritedness. This theory of socialist republicanism seeks to overcome the 
weaknesses and limitations of each respective independent theory and should appeal 
to republicans and socialists alike.  
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Introduction  
 
Philip Pettit’s neo-Roman republican conception of liberty as non-domination has 
made a lasting contribution to debates in political philosophy over the nature of 
freedom. Domination occurs for Pettit when one party has the capacity to arbitrarily 
interfere with and control the possible choices of another on the basis of an opinion or 
an interest not shared by the dominated party.1 To be free, on this view, is to be free 
from the possibility of being subjected to the exercise of arbitrary power. In addition 
to its many adherents and supporters, it has also been met by a growing number of 
critics who question the democratic and egalitarian commitments of Pettit’s particular 
appropriation of republican ideology.2 Many of these “radical” republicans affirm the 
importance of the reconstruction of republican political thought, even though they 
remain critical of certain aspects of Pettit’s interpretation. This article proposes that 
such criticisms are now longstanding, persuasive and constitute a “social” turn in 
republican political thought, which justifies reflection on the underlying principles 
and orientation of a narrowly defined neo-Roman republican tradition. It suggests that 
a more robust and compelling conception of freedom and government can be 
formulated through systematically reorienting the republican political project by 
drawing on the resources of republican and socialist political thought.  
 
Radical republicans have identified a number of weaknesses and omissions in Pettit’s 
neo-Roman republican project. Exemplary criticisms are those raised by Alex 
Gourevitch’s “labour” republicanism, Michael Thompson’s “radical” republicanism 
and Keith Breen’s “workplace” republicanism. Gourevitch argues that Pettit and other 
neo-republicans are inattentive to modern forms of economic domination enacted 
through a system of wage-labour and private property.3 For Gourevitch, Pettit fails to 
address concerns of structural domination resulting from workers’ lack of control over 
the productive assets of the economy and the conditions of their work activity.4 While 
formally free and equal, modern workers are forced to sell their labour to survive, 
which places them in a position of structural dependency.5 Michael Thompson 
contends that Pettit’s focus on inter-agent forms of domination misses the centrality 
of routinised and systemic forms of domination in modern societies. 6  Pettit’s 
emphasis on the arbitrary exercise of power by agents overlooks the core republican 
insight of the dangers of social institutions arranged to systematically distort the 
public’s perception and legitimise oligarchic systems. Keith Breen argues that the 
neo-republican strategy of a right of exit for employees fails to counter employer 
domination in the workplace.7 Workplace republicans such as Breen claim that the 
organisational structure of capitalist firms requires strict state regulation and the 
democratisation of workplaces to ensure worker voice and control within firms.8 
 
All of these critics share a common concern for developing an adequate account of 
structural domination and enhancing popular participation in political and economic 
institutions. I claim that their criticisms of Pettit’s theory of liberty as non-domination 
push in the direction of a reappraisal of this ideal from the perspective of a more fully 
developed socialist republican position. This article draws from contemporary radical 
republicans and the writings of Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg to propose one 
particular version of a socialist republican theory of freedom and government. Rather 
than be faithful to any single thinker’s writings, my intention is for this theory to be 
normatively appealing through an amalgamation of different aspects of republican 
and socialist political thought. Other ways of integrating republican and socialist 
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insights are possible and should be further explored. My claim is that the sketch of a 
theory presented here offers a persuasive picture of how a decent state and civil 
society could be organised and touches upon key desiderata articulated by republicans 
and socialists. 
 
A socialist republican theory of freedom as collective autonomy consists of a concern 
with forces and structures of domination combined with an ideal of citizens sharing in 
public power and collectively determining the direction of public institutions. In 
contrast to strictly negative ideals of liberty, it understands democratic participation as 
an essential rather than an auxiliary component of political freedom. This theory of 
freedom as collective autonomy also captures a wider array of forms of structural 
domination occurring through capitalist market relations than Pettit’s inter-agent 
account of domination. In particular, it calls for the elimination of domination 
occurring through the authoritarian organisational structure of workplaces and the 
operation of free market principles on structurally dominated workers.  
 
Socialist republicans argue for a participatory democratic vision of a decentralised 
state with parliamentary institutions, the rule of law, worker-controlled workplaces, 
community-directed investment and a political culture of solidarity and public-
spiritedness. They seek to combine the benefits of a democratic state oriented towards 
the common good with democratic controls placed over major economic institutions 
to counter forms of domination by powerful economic interests. The theory provides a 
more stable and compelling vision of the institutional framework of a post-capitalist 
society than the communist ideal of a stateless society due to its defence of the rule of 
law and an independent judiciary. Such a framework provides superior protections for 
minorities and dissident groups and is better able to deal with the inevitability of 
ongoing political conflict.  
 
This article first analyses the historical relationship between republican and socialist 
political thought. It contends that there is no definitive incompatibility between the 
two and that points of intersection have been marginalised within traditional 
historiography on the subject. It then offers an account of freedom as collective 
autonomy and the proper organisation and role of a socialist republican state. 
 
 
Republicanism and Socialism 
 
A theory of socialist republicanism should not strike either republicans or socialists as 
a contradiction in terms. After all, republicans claim they offer a more progressive 
account of political liberty than liberals, one that would appeal to socialists while 
avoiding the pitfalls of a positive conception of liberty.9 From a socialist perspective, 
Rosa Luxemburg has stated that “every socialist is naturally a republican,” implying 
that there is no necessary conflict between the two political ideologies.10 For many 
nineteenth century socialists, republicanism was an assumed shared point of 
departure, particularly concerning issues of anti-monarchism, political participation 
and popular control.11 
 
Although scholars contest its origins, it is generally recognised that socialism is a 
post-French revolutionary political ideology that emerged in response to the political 
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and economic inequalities arising from the Industrial Revolution and the dramatic 
transformation of modes of production and working life.12  
 
Mark Bevir has traced the emergence of socialist ideas in the United Kingdom out of 
the republican tradition at the end of the nineteenth century.13 Despite the variety of 
radical parties and affiliations during this period, there was a substantial continuity 
between different populist groups.14 Some of the first socialist republicans saw their 
position as an extension of key republican principles, rather than a repudiation of the 
older civic republican tradition.15 The socialist critique of capitalist forms of work 
was framed partly in republican terminology. It claimed that capitalist forms of wage-
labour created a condition of dependency and servitude for workers. During this 
period, radical political actors employed republican language for socialist ends in a 
number of political journals such as George Julian Harney’s The Red Republican and 
McDouall’s Chartist and Republican Journal. 
 
In France, the attempt by radical republicans to establish a democratic and social 
republic during the 1848 Revolution was conceptualised in terms of advancing the 
previous gains of the 1789 Revolution into the social and economic domains. Radical 
republicans sought to distinguish themselves from bourgeois republicans such as 
Louis-Eugène Cavaignac who was responsible for the June Days massacre in 1848. In 
the minds of the revolutionaries, the republic should not only have a democratic 
political order, but should also embrace a new social order that would equalise 
material conditions through a “right to work” for every citizen. For politician, 
Alexandre Ledru-Rollin, the political republic had to be replicated in the heart of 
industry and production. 16  Radical republicans viewed economic reforms that 
alleviated poverty and provided work for the poor as a necessary complement to 
democratic political institutions.  
 
Despite the defeat of the radical republicans in 1848, this tradition continued in the 
Paris Commune of 1871, which Marx described as an attempt at the creation of a 
“social republic.” The Commune is important for the Marxist tradition because this 
event provides one of the few instances in which Marx offers insight into his 
conception of a possible political structure of a post-capitalist polity. Marx describes 
the Commune as a “working class government” or “the political form at last 
discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labour.”17 His 
writings on the Paris Commune reveal Marx at perhaps his most republican due to his 
emphasis on political participation and popular control. This democratic republican-
inflected Marxism, which is indebted to the French socialist tradition and the Paris 
Commune, continues in prominent socialists such as Karl Kautsky and Rosa 
Luxemburg. 
 
Republicanism experienced a rapid decline in the late 19th century and was largely 
supplanted by socialism within radical circles.18 According to a certain reductive 
understanding of Marxism that existed within parts of the Second International, there 
was a tendency to view the political as epiphenomenal of more profound economic 
relations of production, a position which diverted attention away from traditional 
republican concerns.19 On this view, political considerations of changes in laws or 
forms of government was a distraction from the class struggle to gain control over the 
means of production.20 As part of the shift away from republicanism, socialists began 
to refer to the working class rather than the people; and social conditions rather than 
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political institutions and civic virtue. Lenin’s emphasis on organising a vanguard 
revolutionary party also marginalised the importance of mass participation in politics 
and popular control over elites as necessary requirements for revolutionary 
transformation.21 
 
However, in addition to these changes in political perspective, one can also trace a 
deeper set of shared beliefs. Socialist commitments to working class control over 
productive assets in the economy developed out of republican concerns of domination 
by powerful political and economic elites. A political agenda of self-governance and 
freedom from domination led naturally in an era of industrialisation to a call for 
placing parts of the economy under democratic control. An ongoing concern for 
popular government, democratic forms of organisation and independence as absence 
of external control can also be traced through modern republicanism into the socialist 
tradition.  
 
Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg are interesting cases of theorists who incorporated 
elements of socialist and republican political thought. During the German Revolution 
of 1918/19, Kautsky considered a democratic republic as “the indispensable political 
basis of the new commonwealth we wish to construct… yet it should be even more 
than that. It should become a socialist republic – a commonwealth in which there is 
no longer any place for the exploitation of man by man.”22 Kautsky’s socialist 
republican program at this time consisted of support for political democracy 
(parliamentary institutions, the rule of law and civil rights) combined with the 
socialist organisation of the economy and workers’ councils in workplaces acting as 
centres of institutionalised pressure from below on parliament. Kautsky considered 
that democracy and socialism were the twin goals of the socialist movement. Yet in 
opposition to the Leninist interpretation of Marxism, Kautsky took up a democratic 
republic heritage within Marxism that argued for the importance of a central 
administrative apparatus, parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. For Kautsky, 
the state needed to be “completely transformed” to eliminate its militaristic and 
bureaucratic aspects.23 At the same time, socialists would need “to extend democracy 
from the political to the economic system” in order to transform the basis of a 
democratic republic “into a social republic, instigating a new era in the history of 
humanity.”24 
 
Rosa Luxemburg also drew from republican themes and language, although her 
support for republicanism was more muted and did not extend to the institutional 
framework of a republican state. Luxemburg asserted that “the best bourgeois 
republic is no less a class state.”25 Republicanism for her was more a slogan for 
agitation rather than a goal and desired form of government. Hannah Arendt and 
Stephen Eric Bronner overstate their case in arguing for Luxemburg as a republican in 
the sense of supporting republican state institutions.26 In Luxemburg’s writings, 
republican language of the public realm, civic virtue and mass participation in politics 
was intermingled with ideas of class struggle, revolutionary politics and a Marxist 
critique of capitalism. Luxemburg matters for the socialist republican tradition due to 
her vision of a participatory self-determining society in which individuals would play 
a permanent and active role in directing public institutions. Luxemburg also theorised 
the importance of cultural transformation and socialist civic virtues in the struggle to 
overcome capitalism and construct a more egalitarian society. 
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The intersection of socialism and republicanism as a meaningful set of ideas has been 
marginalised within traditional historiography in favour of forms of neo-Roman and 
civic republicanism.27 I contend that the task of rethinking the republican and socialist 
traditions is one we urgently need to undertake. In so doing, it is important to be 
mindful of how certain aspects of both traditions have proved inadequate when 
confronted with the realities of modern societies.28 The following sketch of a theory 
of socialist republicanism is an attempt to overcome certain limitations by 
synthesising different aspects of the two traditions. 
 
 
Freedom as Collective Autonomy 
 
A socialist republican theory of freedom as collective autonomy consists of a 
collective process of widespread participation in processes of self-governance through 
which individuals exercise direct control over the central institutions of society. This 
follows a participatory republican tradition that understands the republican ideal as 
the protection of people from the exercise of arbitrary power and their participation in 
a self-governing political community.29 Neo-Roman republicans such as Pettit are 
justifiably concerned with the condition of those subject to the arbitrary powers of 
others. However, these neo-republicans unduly restrict an account of freedom by 
focusing exclusively on the “negative” ideal of liberty as non-domination and 
overlooking the important historical role played by individuals taking part in power 
and participating in the rational determination of public life.30 What is significant for 
citizens is not only a condition of protection against the arbitrary exercise of power, 
but to actively shape the character and direction of public institutions through 
participating in processes of self-governance. A richer conception of freedom would 
combine concerns over dominating agents, structures and forces with an attentiveness 
to the requisite practices of deliberation and decision-making of free citizens.31 There 
are three major ways in which a socialist republican theory of freedom as collective 
autonomy seeks to further develop Pettit’s ideal of freedom as non-domination. First, 
its conception of domination should be sufficiently expansive to capture socialist 
insights concerning the structural domination of capitalist relations of economic 
production on workers.32 It should also attend to forms of structural domination that 
occur through gender- and race-based forms of oppression. Second, this theory of 
domination should also include a dimension of ideological domination, which 
explains how workers’ can be influenced to believe that unequal social institutions are 
structured in their best interests. Third, a theory of freedom as collective autonomy 
should include reference to the importance of notions of self-determination and active 
participation in government. For socialist republicans, political participation is an 
essential and constitutive dimension of freedom rather than an auxiliary function or an 
activity that merely secures the conditions of freedom properly understood. 
 
 
Structural Domination 
 
The scope of Pettit’s neo-Roman republican political program is restricted to inter-
agent forms of domination. Pettit has explicitly argued that he does not consider the 
operation of a market economy as inimical to freedom. For Pettit, a system that 
defines rights of private ownership, free exchange and limited state regulation over 
the economy would not constitute domination merely on the grounds that it produces 
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inegalitarian outcomes. He believes that even though the effects of a market economy 
may limit and constrain the possible choices of individuals, this will not be a source 
of domination if “it is the cumulative, unintended effect of people’s mutual 
adjustments.”33 Pettit envisions the market as akin to a set of background conditions 
that could be said to constrain or condition an agent’s freedom, but not to compromise 
it. 
 
Socialist republicans would take issue with the restriction of the concept of 
domination to this purely personal and intentional sense of the term. 34  Alex 
Gourevitch has drawn attention to structural forms of economic domination that could 
occur in the economic sphere through the unequal control of resources in spite of 
notionally equal political rights.35 He argues that the non-subjective and impersonal 
forces of the labour market could impinge on citizens’ freedom in a manner that could 
coherently be described as a form of structural domination. For Gourevitch, although 
the compulsion of workers to enter into employment contracts cannot be attributed to 
any single employer, the structure of the system is the result of conscious efforts to 
organise economic relations to increase the advantages that accrue to wealthy and 
powerful capitalists. Pettit obscures the normatively significant distinction between 
natural environmental factors and the outcomes of a human produced and contingent 
economic system. In the case of the latter, it is not entirely accurate to say that choice 
sets are “randomly distributed” or “unintended” because the operation of the system 
follows a certain logic and is created and sustained by human intervention. 
 
Socialists republicans have also theorised this form of domination through Marx’s 
critique of a system of wage labour. In Wage Labour and Capital, Marx analyses the 
systemic inequalities between labourers and capitalists in relation to employment 
contracts. Marx emphasised this economic exchange rests upon an unequal social 
relationship between two classes of people with different structural positions 
corresponding to different amounts of power and mobility. “The worker, whose only 
source of income is the sale of his labour-power,” might be able to choose between 
different employers, but, Marx adds, they “cannot leave the whole class of buyers.”36 
In her interpretation, Rosa Luxemburg argues that this situation represents one of 
structural domination in which individually uncoordinated, cumulative but 
unintentional actions lead to a condition of unfreedom for workers forced to sell their 
labour. While no single employer necessarily intends to dominate a particular worker, 
due to the “separation of labour-power from the means of production” the worker has 
no commodity to bring to the marketplace to exchange, nothing that is, “but to bring 
himself to market as a commodity, i.e. to bring his own labour-power.”37 Where 
productive assets in the economy are owned by a narrow class of elites and operated 
in their interests, workers remain in a state of general dependence on the class of 
capitalists as a whole. 
 
Socialist republicans should also be concerned with other forms of structural 
domination that operate along the lines of race, gender and sexuality. The fight of 
earlier socialists against capitalism has never been separated from a broader social 
struggle, one which was inscribed in the Erfurt program in opposition to “all forms of 
exploitation and oppression, whether it is directed at a class, a party, a gender, or a 
race.”38 While a full account of the specific dynamics of each type of structural 
domination, including their intersecting operation and effects, goes beyond the scope 
of this article, the theory should be sensitive to vulnerable groups who are 
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disproportionately subject to the exercise of arbitrary power by virtue of their 
membership of a minority group. Pettit emphasises that a conception of freedom as 
non-domination is a pluralistic ideal and can be understood as a “partially common 
good: a common good from the point of view of each vulnerability class.”39 As a 
result, he argues that advocates of freedom as non-domination are committed to 
advancing the freedom of vulnerable classes by counteracting specific forms of 
domination which occur to members of each group. Socialist republicans seek to 
expand rather than restrict the neo-Roman republican understanding of domination, 
and would be similarly attentive to counteracting the domination of all members of 
vulnerable classes.  
 
 
Ideological Domination  
 
A second form of domination for socialist republicans is the control that dominant 
groups exercise over cultural and ideological apparatuses. Through the ownership or 
control of the media, information services, cultural and educational institutions and 
other institutional forms of socialisation, dominant groups can promote their own 
particular understanding of reality as the norm. This refers to the manner in which 
social institutions shape subjects to have certain beliefs, desires and identities that 
accord with the status quo. Michael Thompson’s concept of “constitutive domination” 
describes how domination can occur through the systematic distortion of perceptions 
of the public good to benefit the interests of a narrow circle of elites.40 This process 
supports other forms of domination by providing legitimising narratives justifying the 
necessity of systemic and routinised forms of domination such as wage labour and 
oligarchic political structures. This need not involve the arbitrary interference of any 
particular agent over another because through this process agents come to internalise 
certain norms and values without the need for overt forms of intrusion or repression.  
 
Ideological domination occurs through the constitution of individuals’ deep-seated 
mental structures rather than by interfering arbitrarily in their rational choices. This 
aspect of domination is less visible and measurable than direct interference and as a 
result its effects often go unnoticed. It allows dominant groups to create and reinforce 
unconscious barriers and obstacles to challenging unequal arrangements of social 
power. By presenting these as part of a natural order and state of affairs, a dominant 
ideology can be used to justify and legitimate oppressive social conditions. Such a 
theory of domination rests on a conception of the ideological formation of subjects 
through social institutions. Here, ideology refers to the way in which a subject’s 
experience of reality is mediated by a more or less coherent system of ideas, which 
tends to reflect the dominant set of power relations in society. Through ideological 
domination, subjects accept positions of subordination within social hierarchies based 
on a belief in the justness or inevitability of this state of affairs.41 Luxemburg argued 
that during the German Revolution the bourgeoisie still exercised an ideological hold 
over the proletariat, which led them to eventually give up power and vote in a 
constituent assembly rather than maintain power in a council system.42  
 
One key question that presents itself is what differentiates this form of domination 
from unobjectionable forms of social reproduction. When, in other words, do elites 
exercise undue or dominating power over social institutions compared to non-
dominating forms of influence. The conventional socialist response has been to 
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identify a subject’s real interests as opposed to their perceived interests within an 
oppressive system, however these may be determined. When the biases of a system 
are mobilised to obscure social reality and promote mystifications that distort a 
subject’s real interests and naturalise the power of a dominant group, this system 
becomes dominating. However, the determination of such “real” interests has proved 
a stumbling block to theories of ideology critique, with both a Marxist scientific 
knowledge43 and a Kantian use of critical reason44 attracting certain objections.45 
While socialist republicans consider a concept of ideological domination to be an 
important component of a compelling understanding of modern forms of domination, 
more theoretical work is needed to better understand the operation of its normative 
dimension. 
 
 
Participation in Self-Government 
 
Pettit’s account of non-domination is based primarily on a negative ideal of freedom 
“defined by a status in which the evils associated with interference are avoided rather 
than by access to the instruments of democratic control, participatory or 
representative.”46 The most influential critics of Pettit’s account of the ideal of liberty 
as non-domination have traditionally focussed on his account of domination rather 
than his argument that democratic participation has no “definitional connection with 
liberty.”47 While arguing for an expansion of our understanding of domination, 
prominent critics such as Alex Gourevitch have worked from within the negative 
liberty tradition.48  
 
However, another group of critics have contested the historical accuracy and 
normative appeal of Pettit’s ideal of liberty as non-domination. Alan Coffee has taken 
issue with the primarily “negative” formulation of republican liberty by Pettit and has 
contended that more emphasis should be placed on participation in self-government.49 
Coffee distinguishes between a sphere of laws and a sphere of norms and argues that 
marginalised groups may be particularly vulnerable to the dominating effects of the 
latter if they are unable to participate in the shaping of these norms. K. Sabeel 
Rahman has also claimed that responses to modern forms of structural domination 
should begin with attempts to expand the political capacities of ordinary citizens.50 
Keith Breen has argued that even Pettit himself must implicitly rely on a positive 
ideal of autonomy: 
 
[his] understanding clearly goes beyond an ‘absence of mastery by others’ to embrace the 
‘presence’ of a specific sort of ‘self-mastery,’ the ability of persons to independently 
deliberate over issues and to rationally determine their actions in conjunction with others.51 
 
Following these criticisms, socialist republicans emphasise the positive dimensions of 
political freedom. Luxemburg argued that politics “must proceed step by step out of 
the active participation of the masses; it must be under their direct influence, 
subjected to the control of complete public activity.”52 In the collective autonomy 
approach, democratic participation in shared processes of self-governance is an 
essential element of how freedom is understood. Socialist republicans envisage 
freedom as a collective practice and an ongoing struggle against forces and structures 
of domination. Rather than consider freedom as a particular status or condition of 
proof against domination, it is better conceived as the exercise of political capacities 
of self-determination. It is distinct from both liberal and neo-republican ideals of 
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freedom due to the importance of ordinary citizens participating in political processes. 
For socialist republicans, Pettit’s emphasis on the contestatory over the authorial 
moment of democratic politics overlooks the possibility of developing institutional 
mechanisms for citizens to increase their control at the early stages of agenda-setting 
and discourse shaping. To merely contest laws and policy that have been created by 
political elites abandons an important sphere of democratic control and makes do with 
a diminished capacity to influence political processes.53 
 
Democratic participation is also an essential element of political freedom because of 
its educative function. Since freedom is a practice that must be learnt, participation in 
politics enables citizens to educate themselves and come to a better realisation of their 
opinions and interests. Luxemburg argued that “the working classes in every country 
only learn to fight in the course of their struggles.”54 While the “bourgeois class rule 
has no need of the political training and education of the entire mass of the people,” 
socialism relies upon an active citizenry assuming greater control over their collective 
destiny.55 Participation in public life “is the life element, the very air without which it 
[socialism] is not able to exist.”56 Citizens must “feel out the ground, try out, 
experiment, test now one way now another.”57 
 
This conception of freedom as collective autonomy is less vulnerable to a number of 
the classic criticisms of positive liberty than has been assumed. A major criticism 
levelled against positive liberty by both Isaiah Berlin and Philip Pettit is that it entails 
unappealing ideas of self-mastery and the rule of a perceived rational section of the 
community over another.58 Yet the ideal of collective autonomy outlined here of 
protection against domination and participation in self-government need not involve 
any such subordination. Nor does collective autonomy rely on a conception of a 
homogenous community and communitarian ideas of a political community clarifying 
a single set of shared values. Freedom understood as collective autonomy does not 
require fundamental agreement on a singular conception of the good life for citizens 
to participate in processes of self-government. It would be sufficient for citizens to 
understand themselves as free and equal citizens committed to an ongoing process of 
self-governance without any further stipulations concerning the essence of human 
beings or the inner telos of the human race. 
 
 
Socialist Republican Government 
 
Socialist Republican Aims: Citizen Control and Equalising Power 
 
A socialist republicanism should articulate a conception of the role of the state and 
how it should be organised. Such an institutional framework should represent a 
desirable ideal for the organisation of political and economic life. In contrast to the 
communist aim of the dissolution or withering away of the state, socialist republicans 
argue that the institutions of the state should be submitted to the will of a democratic 
citizenry and oriented towards the common interest.  
 
Socialist republicans believe that the institutions of the state, constitutionalism, a 
parliament and the rule of law are necessary for a durable and realistic form of 
politics.59 They recognise that any large, industrialised and complex polity which 
exists alongside other states in a global political system will require some form of 
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central administrative apparatus.60 They do not view the state as an inherently 
oppressive institution that is merely an organ of class domination. As a result, they are 
less sceptical than communists towards suitably transformed state institutions, which 
would express the collective will of the people. While state institutions are susceptible 
to elite capture in which powerful economic interests dominate political life and direct 
state activity towards their private ends, the state is a site of struggle and a possible 
vehicle for citizens to express their democratic will.61  
 
The two principal aims of a socialist republican state are 1) to enable citizens to 
exercise control over public institutions in order to direct them towards common 
interests and 2) to counter the domination of economic and political elites through 
balancing power relations between citizens. 
 
The first aim for socialist republicans is to arrange public institutions in a manner that 
maximises the input and control that citizens can exercise over important sites of 
deliberation and decision-making. The liberal democratic state has historically been 
utilised principally by powerful economic interests in order to enact laws favourable 
to maintaining their interests. The struggle in and against the state should be viewed 
as one in which citizens mobilise to defend their interests through both state 
institutions and civil society groups. Public institutions should be considered as 
mechanisms through which citizens can organise collective action and express their 
collective will. This would require the state to be transformed from a set of 
institutions that is relatively closed and impenetrable to ordinary citizens to one that is 
susceptible to greater levels of citizen control. Marx wrote that “[f]reedom consists in 
converting the state from an organ superimposed upon society into one completely 
subordinate to it.”62 For the state to be subordinate to its citizens means they would be 
able to exercise a degree of control over how it functions and impose a relevant 
direction on governmental processes.  
 
Decision-making that occurs in state institutions should not only reflect the collective 
will of citizens and track their interests, it should also be causally connected to 
processes that enable citizens to have some say in how relevant decisions will be 
made.63 Benjamin Barber notes that although every citizen cannot take part in every 
relevant decision, the aim should be for citizens to participate “not necessarily at 
every level and in every instance, but frequently enough and in particular when basic 
policies are being decided and when significant power is being deployed.”64 These 
principles of citizen control should also be extended from the governmental sphere to 
other central institutions of society such as workplaces, economic regulatory 
institutions and the army. Luxemburg argued that the citizenry should make “the 
entire political and economic life” its own and give it “a conscious, free, and 
autonomous direction.” 65  The aim of a socialist republican state should be to 
maximise the opportunities for citizens to collectively shape the underlying structures 
and conditions of their shared public life. 
 
However, the creation of new participatory mechanisms will only result in the 
reorientation of public institutions towards common interests if the underlying 
balance of power between social classes is challenged and fundamentally shifted. The 
second aim of a socialist republican state should be an attempt to rebalance the terms 
of power between classes and organise a counterpower against the privileged position 
of economic and political elites. Disaffected citizens sense that representative 
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institutions are dominated by a narrow circle of elites that control decision-making, 
which results in outcomes that are not in the interests of the majority of workers. In 
response to the domination of the democratic system by elites the power of ordinary 
workers should be expanded through enhancing their capacities for collective action. 
The private power of large corporations and wealthy individuals must be met with the 
organised power of workers through institutionalised channels that enhance their 
collective democratic agency.  
 
The desire to subject the institutions of the state to the control of all citizens and to 
simultaneously empower workers against elites creates a tension within the theory 
between the universal category of “the citizen” and the narrower category of 
“workers.” The version of socialist republicanism defended here seeks to hold on to 
the importance of both categories for different theoretical purposes. Unlike in some 
forms of socialism, socialist republicans do not advocate for a temporary form of 
class-rule in which non-workers would be excluded from political decision-making. 
In versions of workers’ democracy proposed by Anton Pannekoek, for example, the 
sovereignty of workers’ councils would entail the exercise of “workers power to the 
exclusion of the other classes.”66 Karl Kautsky, on the other hand, convincingly 
argued that a society which sought to put an end to forms of exploitation based on 
class would require universalist political structures that enshrined democratic rights 
and protections for all citizens.67 In debates over the National Assembly during the 
German Revolution, Kautsky insisted on defending universal suffrage, parliamentary 
institutions, and an electoral strategy of workers’ parties gaining a majority in 
parliament. The aim of a socialist republican state should be to guarantee the 
universal protection of civil liberties and democratic rights of participation. 
Luxemburg argued that “Social Democracy has always contended that it represents 
not only the class interests of the proletariat but also the progressive aspirations of the 
whole of contemporary society. It represents the interests of all who are oppressed by 
bourgeois domination.”68 A socialist republican state must also ensure that there are 
institutional mechanisms available to workers that can act as a countervailing power 
against the potential rise of political and economic elites who have historically 
attempted to concentrate power in their own hands and sought private benefit from 
public goods. Having established citizen control over public institutions and 
equalising power between citizens as the two aims of a socialist republican state, I 
now turn to the proper organisation of the state to fulfil these aims. 
 
 
Transformation of the State 
 
Socialist republicans consider the basic institutional framework of a democratic 
republic – constitutionalism, parliamentary institutions, the rule of law – as an 
important starting point for a social republic. However, in his socialist republican 
political program put forward during the German Revolution, Karl Kautsky also 
recommended further extensive political and economic transformations to state 
structures.69 Kautsky sought to show how the state could be transformed from a 
militarised and hierarchical structure into an instrument that would express the 
collective will of ordinary citizens. For Kautsky: 
 
The state mechanism that has existed until now must be completely refashioned [völlig 
umgestaltet]. The bureaucracy must be stripped of its power and many of its functions, and 
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must be placed under the supervision/control of the democratic representatives of the people 
in the municipality, the provinces, the states and the nation.70 
 
The central changes Kautsky recommended were the transformation of the standing 
army into a people’s militia, the subordination of the executive to a legislature elected 
through universal suffrage, the socialisation of the economy and the granting of 
extensive rights of self–government to local bodies including policing, taxation, 
housing and basic social services. Kautsky disagreed with Lenin that the institutions 
of the modern state should be dissolved and replaced by some alternative of a 
“fundamentally different type” based on the Paris Commune.71 On this point, he 
considered that Marx’s analysis of the Paris Commune needed to be updated for 
contemporary conditions. Kautsky agreed with the Commune’s attempt at “the most 
comprehensive expansion of self-government, the popular election of all officials and 
the subordination of all members of representative bodies to the control and discipline 
of the organised people.” 72  However, he considered that a basic technical-
administrative apparatus could not be completely “smashed,” but rather should be 
subordinated to a people’s assembly through which administrators would be subject to 
control by representatives of the people elected through universal suffrage.  
 
There are three principles from Kautsky’s analysis that could guide contemporary 
socialist republicanism: demilitarisation, decentralisation and democratisation. First, 
the state’s repressive capacities have to be drastically reduced through the 
minimisation of expenditure on its standing army and police force. Rosa Luxemburg 
went so far as to argue that “the entire war and munitions industries must be 
abolished.”73 Luxemburg and Kautsky both agreed that “[i]nstead of a standing army, 
there should be a people’s militia.”74 The people’s militia is a body of citizens 
organised for military service that would be called upon only in emergencies and for 
national self-defence. Recruits should receive training alongside their civilian 
occupations and only the most senior officials should be professional soldiers. These 
reforms were designed to eliminate the capacity of the state to wage an aggressive 
war and to threaten other nations. Instead of a balance of power to act as a deterrent to 
other states, Kautsky argued a socialist republican state should support the 
establishment of an international regulatory body such as the United Nations and 
encourage multinational co-operation in which different nations could “participate as 
equals amongst equals.”75 Through an “international agreement on disarmament” it 
was hoped that “the size of the people’s militia could be “adjusted accordingly.”76 In 
sum, the “bureaucratic militaristic” aspects of the state should be transformed along 
with its foreign policy towards a pacifistic stance relying on international co-operation 
with military options used only as a last resort of self-defence.77 
 
Socialist republicans also support a reorganisation of the police force that would 
reduce its political function, but one which would continue to enable the state to 
enforce its laws. Marx wrote very little about the nature of post-capitalist society and 
leaves us no firm indications on the question of whether a legal system would 
disappear in a socialist society following the withering away of the state.78 While 
some Marxists have inferred that the legal system was a bourgeois institution, Karl 
Kautsky considered that “law and order are preconditions to accomplishing 
socialism” and that “it is totally ridiculous to believe that law and order are necessary 
only in the interests of exploitation.”79 Kautsky argued that “the state must also hand 
over policing powers to the municipalities and districts.”80 In this proposal, police 
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would still be employed by local officials to enforce laws, but their political function 
of repressing opposition groups, stifling protests and supporting private property 
relations would be eliminated. 
 
A second key transformation of the state is the devolution of decision-making power 
and authority according to a principle of subsidiarity. In order for people to exercise 
collective autonomy, power should be located at a local level where possible and only 
transferred to a central authority in cases where issues cannot be adequately dealt with 
at a local level. This forms part of a broader program to break up the centralised 
bureaucratic power of the state and minimise the potential for state apparatuses to 
dominate citizens. Kautsky advocated “immediately granting the right of extensive 
self-government … to the municipalities, administrative districts and provinces.”81 He 
argued that a whole variety of political issues were manageable at a local level such as 
taxation, policing, housing, social services and certain types of food production.  
 
A third principle of political transformation relates to the institutionalisation of 
pressure on parliament from below through civic organisations that mobilise 
democratic citizens. For Kautsky: 
 
The introduction of a parliament is one aspect of democratization, but it is not sufficient in 
itself. Important as the dependence of the government on parliament may be, it leads to 
democratization only when it is accompanied by the growing dependence of parliament on the 
popular masses.82  
 
Kautsky emphasised the importance of a close relationship between democratic 
institutions and the organised masses. He believed that “a parliament that does not 
derive its support from the mass of the people is powerless. On the other hand, the 
people in a parliamentary state that leaves its fate exclusively in the hands of the 
parliament is likewise impotent.” 83 Kautsky believed that there should be 
institutionalised pressure from below in order to hold representatives accountable and 
struggle for the particular interests of the most oppressed in society. While Kautsky 
envisaged these as workers’ councils which had arisen during the German Revolution, 
such institutions could take on a variety of different forms of civic associations that 
mobilise citizens and patrol parliamentary representatives.  
 
These three principles would be incomplete without the most important aspect of 
transforming public institutions: the democratisation of workplaces and public control 
over the direction of the economy. 
 
 
Democratisation of the Economy 
 
Rosa Luxemburg argued that the aim of capitalist economies was “the enrichment of a 
small number of idlers,” rather than “delivering to the public at large the means of 
satisfying all its needs.”84 She called for productive assets to be “taken into common 
property of the people” in order for them to be “national property… under the control 
of society.”85 Yet while Luxemburg had a clear idea of the dangers of concentrated 
economic power, it was Kautsky who most fully developed an institutional proposal 
for the democratisation of the economy. Kautsky argued that a socialist republic 
should aim “to extend democracy from the political to the economic system”86 This 
consisted of worker-managed workplaces combined with the creation of new 
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economic institutions that would enable co-ordination across workplaces and 
industries and balance the interests of different sections of the community in the 
public steering of the economy. The aim of these arrangements for Kautsky was to 
avoid the undemocratic pitfalls of “statist” versions of socialisation such as the Soviet 
Union. 
 
Workers exercising collective autonomy should have control over major decisions 
that affect their individual workplace such as the working environment and conditions 
of employment. Some form of workplace democracy is essential in which workers’ 
committees would manage their workplaces. However, if ownership and control over 
each individual workplace were handed to workers directly this would create vast 
inequalities across different industries and might incentivise workers to benefit 
themselves at the expense of the public. While the democratic intervention of workers 
into their workplaces is important to provide them with a voice at the level of 
management, the rights of workers should be balanced with the need for broader co-
ordination across workplaces and production for community needs. Therefore a 
second layer of co-ordinating organisations would be necessary to organise across 
workplaces and integrate them into a broader institutional structure. At a national 
level a new form of economic organisation would be required to assist with the 
direction of the economy as a whole. This institution would also be in charge of 
questions of public investment, infrastructure and broader questions of economic 
steering. Kautsky proposed that such an organisation would consist of one third 
workers’ representatives, one third organised consumers and one third representatives 
of the state administration in order to adequately balance the interests of different 
sections of the community: 
 
With each branch of production that is transferred from capitalist to State or municipal 
ownership, a new organization should be created, which would enable the workers and the 
consumers, as well as science [state officials], to exercise the necessary influence upon the 
adaptation of the processes of production. Such an organization would be quite different from 
State bureaucracy as we have hitherto understood it.”87 
 
Public assets would be owned by the state but opened up to participatory mechanisms 
so they could as far as possible be managed at the municipal level and subject to 
democratic controls. Importantly for Kautsky, this new economic organisation would 
not be co-terminal with the state. Kautsky was adamant that socialisation should not 
be viewed as synonymous with nationalistion and state ownership: “The state is not 
the appointed instrument of socialization in all branches of industry.”88 In cases where 
“branches of production or of communications serve narrow local ends” then 
“[m]unicipal ownership and management is the proper solution of the problem.”89 
Under a socialised economy, the municipality would become an important site of 
local management and control. Kautsky’s plan was that a thoroughly decentralised 
and democratic vision of economic planning would avoid the injustices of a capitalist 
market system while also overcoming the inefficiencies and bureaucratism of Soviet 
state socialism. Unlike market socialists, Kautsky did not envisage a pricing system 
for the allocation of goods and services in a democratised economy. Instead, public 
services would be run for the benefit of consumers and any profits would be invested 
back into communal production.  
 
The democratisation of the economy in a socialist republic would thus promote public 
control over economic production through a co-ordinated system of economic 
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institutions that respected the self-governance of producers at the level of the 
individual workplace, but that enabled public control over the direction of the 
economy as a whole. I will now examine how these institutional transformations 
would need to be combined with parallel changes in political culture such that citizens 
would routinely act in ways that expressed solidarity for other citizens and public-
spiritedness towards public institutions. 
 
 
Socialist Civic Virtues 
 
In 1917, reflecting upon the prospects for the Russian Revolution, Karl Kautsky 
wrote, “[i]n order to liberate themselves, the workers not only need certain material 
preconditions at their disposal and to be numerically strong; they also have to become 
new people, endued with the abilities that are required for the reorganisation of state 
and society.”90 The problem could not be addressed by simply establishing new 
political and economic institutions as the oppressive relations were deeply rooted in 
the national psyche and could only be overcome through more profound changes of 
mentality. 
 
The political transformation of the state would also require a corresponding shift in 
the political culture of its citizens. Luxemburg argued for the importance of a 
widespread change in social norms and patterns of behaviour to ensure the success of 
political change. Adopting the republican-inspired language of “socialist civic 
virtues,” she considered that worker-controlled institutions would need to be 
supported by widely accepted socialist norms that would be common knowledge and 
followed as a matter of habit. Luxemburg argued that workers should direct 
themselves away from the egoism, individualism and competition that predominated 
in capitalist societies and towards socialist virtues of solidarity, public-spiritedness 
and self-discipline. She argued that “[s]ocialism in life demands a complete spiritual 
transformation in the masses degraded by centuries of bourgeois rule. Social instincts 
in place of egotistical ones, mass initiative in place of inertia, idealism which 
conquers all suffering.”91 
 
Luxemburg rarely wrote about the requirements of a post-capitalist society, but in the 
following illuminating passage she outlines what she considered as the necessary 
changes in political culture: 
 
From dead machines assigned their place in production by capital, the proletarian masses must 
learn to transform themselves into the free and independent directors of this process. They 
have to acquire the feeling of responsibility proper to active members of the collectivity which 
alone possesses ownership of all social wealth. They have to develop industriousness without 
the capitalist whip, the highest productivity without slavedrivers, discipline without the yoke, 
order without authority. The highest idealism in the interest of the collectivity, the strictest 
self-discipline, the truest public spirit of the masses are the moral foundations of socialist 
society, just as stupidity, egotism, and corruption are the moral foundations of capitalist 
society…. All these socialist civic virtues, together with the knowledge and skills necessary to 
direct socialist enterprises, can be won by the mass of workers only through their own 
activity, their own experience.” 92 
 
Adopting the republican language of civic virtue, but interpreting it as action in 
solidarity with other workers rather than as action aimed at preserving a state’s 
institutions, Luxemburg put forward a vision of the oppressed classes exercising self-
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determination over public institutions. Such a cultural dimension is an important 
element in a broader program of a socialist republican theory of the state and civil 
society. 
 
This article has sought to articulate a socialist republican ideal of freedom and 
government and has not outlined a political strategy of how such a socialist republic 
could be achieved from the position of many of today’s liberal democracies. It has 
confined itself to sketch the outlines of a theory which will require further elaboration 
and development. The socialist republican viewpoint that I have developed here 
emerges with thinkers such as Marx, Kautsky and Luxemburg, but also draws on 
other ideas in the radical republican and Marxist traditions. Following the many 
sustained criticisms of a narrow and conservative reading of the republican tradition 
in Philip Pettit’s neo-Roman republicanism, this article has argued for embracing the 
resources available within the socialist and republican traditions for articulating an 
appealing socialist republican vision of freedom and government. 																																																								
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